



Image: Pro-government demonstrations in state media

Protests in Iran are drawing to a close

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The violent nighttime protests in Iran appear to be slowly subsiding, although this is denied by Western activists. Instead, increasingly large, [pro-government](#) demonstrations [are taking place during the day](#). What's the conclusion? A quick summary.

The trigger was legitimate protests against clumsy and damaging monetary policy decisions, which had hit small traders in the bazaars particularly hard. Added to this were inflation, anger over water mismanagement and unemployment, and, to a lesser extent, resentment over the authoritarian selection of candidates for public office. These were the triggers. Information available today suggests that agents of Mossad and CIA activated their networks in response. The resulting [brutal murders](#), often with [firearms](#) and frequently following the same pattern, the arson of [mosques](#), buildings, and even [people](#), point to targeted and trained "rebels," not to a popular uprising that arose organically from public sentiment. Testimonies from surviving insurgents confirm this, even if these accounts are dismissed in the West as Iranian propaganda. Everything was reminiscent of events in Syria, Libya, or Ukraine.

Constitutional Monarchy

Surveys conducted by Western [institutes](#) clearly show that the desire for a constitutional monarchy exists only in a minority of the population. For example, one report found that in a 2025 survey, approximately 17% of respondents named a constitutional monarchy as their preferred system. And that survey was funded by the US, with a correspondingly biased selection of respondents and a carefully worded question. Therefore, the reporting in Western media is rather bizarre. The public's attitude toward the government, presented in a largely scientifically neutral manner, can be gleaned from a survey by the [Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland \(CISSM\) & IranPoll](#). Although the most recently published survey dates from 2018, it paints a picture immediately following similar unrest, and at that time, respondents certainly did not support a violent overthrow of the government, and implicitly, they certainly did not endorse the reintroduction of a "constitutional monarchy."

Review

January 4–7, 2026: During this period, observers and activist networks reported protests taking place in *several districts of Tehran*, as well as in other cities such as Kazerun and in western Iran. Independent reports sometimes cite figures ranging from *several hundred to a thousand demonstrators per evening*; the protests are highly fragmented but increasingly [visible](#) nationwide.

January 8–10, 2026: By January 10, the protests had [spread](#) significantly. According to Western-funded human rights groups and activists, demonstrations and clashes took place in *dozens to hundreds of locations across Iran*. Reports indicate that on some nights (e.g., January 9 or 10), "thousands of people" were present in multiple cities simultaneously, including Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, and others. For example, one overview of the protest movement over this period cites "than 2,000 protesters between January 8 and 10" [more](#) (although this figure can vary considerably depending on the source), and it confirms that the protests were active across all provinces. Not all of them turned violent.

The night of January 11–12, 2026: Pro-Western activists and media outlets [reported](#) that the protests *had not subsided*, but had in some cases spread further or continued – despite a nationwide internet shutdown and a massive deployment of security forces. After more than two weeks of unrest, the situation was very tense and involved thousands of simultaneous demonstrations in multiple locations. Overall, however, the violence appeared to be decreasing, not least because security forces were increasingly engaged in firefights with violent groups and were able to neutralize some of them.

by the Iranian hacking group Handala, [A list of 600 alleged Mossad agents, disseminated](#) has so far only [been circulated](#) by state media and **not** confirmed by official government sources. While there are recurring reports of Mossad agents being arrested and even killed, no official government figure has specifically addressed this list. Nevertheless, given the arrests following the 12-day war against Iran, it can be assumed that Iran and the CIA have hundreds, if not over a thousand, agents active in the country. When one considers the figures of "*a few thousand demonstrators*"—even if the total number across the country exceeded 10,000—in relation to Iran's nearly 90 million inhabitants, there is a well-founded suspicion that the leaders of these

violent demonstrators are pursuing a different agenda than the original protesters, who were demonstrating against economic problems.

The number of victims

Apparently, over one hundred rioting participants (who in the West are considered non-violent opposition protesters) were killed. Al Jazeera also reports more than 100 security forces killed in recent days ([as of January 12, 2026](#)), indicating heavy losses among security forces and demonstrating that the claim that the violence [is solely perpetrated by the authorities is false](#). This is despite well-edited videos allegedly showing security forces shooting at "*unarmed demonstrators*," while the government showed Western ambassadors videos of gun battles with armed groups.

This level of extreme violence, so sudden and seemingly without provocation, also suggests a long-term, planned uprising. A video, it was claimed, showed groups of 100 to 300 people setting fire to a [mosque](#) and then running to their next target. Such reports disappear as quickly as they appear and are almost impossible to verify.

The [property damage](#) caused by the "demonstrators" was considerable and malicious, affecting not only government agencies and the state—that is, all taxpayers—but also, and especially, those who had initially protested against economic problems: small business owners. There were systematic attacks, as mentioned, on mosques, but also on emergency services; over 50 heavy fire engines were set on fire, and firefighters were injured and [killed](#). Parts of the transportation infrastructure and government buildings used for administration, regardless of who holds power, were destroyed. Much of this had little to do with the regime itself, but rather seemed aimed at harming the population.

The measures were apparently aimed at creating as much chaos as possible. The so-called rebels, who in a Western country would likely be called terrorists, conquered no territory and received little support from the population and none at all from the official government structure. Unlike the first CIA coup in 1953, there was evidently no betrayal within the military. However, the "*freedom fighters*" benefited from Western technology, money, information, and coordinated Western propaganda campaigns that created the impression they had already overthrown the government or were about to do so.

As previously explained on TKP, this uprising had no chance of success and was likely orchestrated to create the conditions for foreign intervention. Israeli instigation was openly admitted at the highest levels of US politics and within Israel itself. While the justification for the last war was Iran's supposedly imminent "*atomic bomb*," this time the pretext will once again be a "*humanitarian*" one—bombs for freedom, human rights, and democracy.

A detail about mosques that were set on fire

The article's format doesn't allow for addressing all points, but the issue of burning mosques will be addressed as an example. Western sources claim that the mosques are also bases for the Basij militias and that these militias used violence against the demonstrators. This initially sounds like the usual claims made by "*Hamas headquarters*." But this is a black-and-white view. This

organization is part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and is dominated by both orthodox and radical elements. It does indeed have bases in mosques because its members also perform cultural and religious functions.

According to Iranian documents, the Basij militia is based on Article 151 of the Iranian Constitution, which stipulates that *all citizens should be trained for the defense of the nation*. These militias are tasked, among other things, with maintaining internal security, providing aid in the event of disasters, and supporting the police, military, and/or Revolutionary Guards when necessary. They also have cultural and social responsibilities, such as organizing social, religious, and charitable activities. Most notably, they are referred to as the "*Revolution Shield of the 1979* ."

In official Iranian [contexts](#), the Basij is described as the "*key to national security*" over the last four decades, and the organization is said to be one of the factors that *stability and order in the country* . have guaranteed

Its members are often described as political opponents of the "*moderates* , and vice versa. Some moderates have even feared that the Baji could be at the heart of a coup if liberalization progresses too quickly. However, in times of constant external threat, all Iranians recognize that the Revolutionary Guard and the Baij are on the front lines fighting against foreign aggressors. As great as the political differences are, so too is the recognition of the services and sacrifices this organization has made for the country. Hatred of the Basij is more substantial among those segments of the population who fundamentally reject the constitution and the social system itself. But even these individuals would likely not resort to lethal force against them or destroy mosques.

Therefore, the conclusion that the acts of violence, the shootings, the murders and the mosque fires were caused by forces imported into the country from abroad is convincing.

The reaction of the authorities

The Iranian authorities were unimpressed by Trump's threats of intervention in the event of a harsh crackdown. They put their quite capable air defense forces on high alert, threatened retaliation, and cracked down hard on the "*moderate rebels* ." Now, Trump seems to be considering using only "*non-military* " options against "*the regime* , possibly in light of the demonstrative activation of the modernized and improved air defenses. But of course, it's also possible that such statements are merely intended to lull the Iranian security forces into complacency. Similar to the situation shortly before the 12-Day War, when the next meeting for negotiations was even scheduled just before the attack. The fact that the head of state [can move](#) about in the midst of a crowd of people certainly speaks volumes. Even if he were killed, there would be no regime change, as the [last "unexpected death](#) " of a government official demonstrated.

The old script of the USA

In principle, the US is still following the same playbook by a "*think tank* " called "*Which Way to Persia* laid out [?". \[The goal is to starve Iran, finance and arm\]\(#\) terrorists , and destroy the country](#)

from within. Sham agreements generate good press at home and abroad, only to be quickly broken, naturally under the pretext that Iran is not complying.

The [2009 document](#) details exactly what US policy implemented in the following years. It implicitly explains that the US public must be lied to in order to gain approval for expensive regime-change measures, and that the supported opposition groups, some of which were previously listed as terrorist organizations in the US, such as the MEK, would not exist without US support. As usual, the development of these strategies is made possible through funding from the oil, pharmaceutical, arms, and high-tech industries.

The next steps

This is likely [Several show trials](#) to follow in Iran, further reinforcing the public perception of foreign influence. Details of gruesome murders involving beheadings (unconfirmed) and burnings by the "*moderate rebels*" are already beginning to circulate, dismissed in the West as propaganda and fake news, much like the atrocities committed by the "*moderate rebels*" in Syria. Even during the demonstrations, the government repeatedly stated that protests were permissible and beneficial, serving to draw the government's attention to its mistakes and to learn from them. Meaningful reforms are expected to be adopted and implemented, corruption curbed, and attempts made through negotiations to achieve a situation where defense spending no longer needs to be maintained at its current level. Every Iranian rial spent on defense is a rial that is unavailable for infrastructure and economic development.

Israel and the US are likely to further intensify their propaganda efforts, investing a few more billion in bots and influencers, spreading fabricated and real isolated incidents, and claiming that their sanctions and wars are solely for the sake of human rights in Iran. People fleeing the ever-worsening living conditions are portrayed as dissidents... while at the same time the Palestinians have no human rights and the daily killing in Palestine continues.